Under Smith v. Employment Division, how are generally applicable neutral laws affecting religious exercise treated?

Under Smith v. Employment Division, how are generally applicable neutral laws affecting religious exercise treated?

• A. Under Smith, generally applicable neutral laws are allowed.
• B. The government must provide religious exemptions whenever a law affects religious practice.
• C. The government may never burden religious exercise.
• D. Strict scrutiny always applies to laws affecting religion.

Answer: (A)

The key idea tested is the standard from Smith about neutral laws of general applicability. Smith holds that if a law or government policy is neutral toward religion and generally applicable—meaning it applies to everyone in the same way and isn’t tailored to burden religious practice—then it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if it burdens religious exercise. In the Smith case, the Oregon rule banning peyote was a neutral, generally applicable law that did not single out religious practice, so the burden on Smith’s religious exercise was permissible without requiring exemptions or applying strict scrutiny. That’s why the correct takeaway is that generally applicable neutral laws affecting religious exercise are allowed. The other statements don’t fit Smith: automatic exemptions whenever religion is affected, a blanket prohibition on any burden, or that strict scrutiny always applies in these situations, all misstate the Smith framework.

The key idea tested is the standard from Smith about neutral laws of general applicability. Smith holds that if a law or government policy is neutral toward religion and generally applicable—meaning it applies to everyone in the same way and isn’t tailored to burden religious practice—then it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if it burdens religious exercise. In the Smith case, the Oregon rule banning peyote was a neutral, generally applicable law that did not single out religious practice, so the burden on Smith’s religious exercise was permissible without requiring exemptions or applying strict scrutiny.

That’s why the correct takeaway is that generally applicable neutral laws affecting religious exercise are allowed. The other statements don’t fit Smith: automatic exemptions whenever religion is affected, a blanket prohibition on any burden, or that strict scrutiny always applies in these situations, all misstate the Smith framework.